Extrinsic consequences have been criticized on the grounds that they decrease intrinsic motivation or internally initiated behavior. Two popular rationales for this criticism, Lepper's overjustification hypothesis (1981) and Deci's motivational theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985) , are reviewed and the criticism is then redefined behaviorally. "Intrinsically controlled" behavior is defined as behavior maintained by response-produced reinforcers, and the question concerning extrinsic consequences is thus restated as follows: When behavior is maintained by response-produced stimuli, does extrinsic reinforcement decrease the reinforcing value of those stimuli? The empirical support for this detrimental effect is summarized briefly, and several possible explanations for the phenomenon are offered. Research results that reflect on the effect's generality and social significance are discussed next, with the conclusion that the effect is transient and not likely to occur at all if extrinsic rewards are reinforcing, noncompetitive, based on reasonable performance standards, and delivered repetitively.
In applied settings operant conditioning procedures often include the deliberate manipulation of behavioral consequences such as money, praise, tokens, edibles, and access to preferred activities. For over 10 years such practices have been criticized on the grounds that although they may increase the frequency of behavior, they may also decrease an individual's "intrinsic motivation" to perform the behavior (Condry, 1977; Deci, 1971; Lepper & Greene, 1978) . Thus, many have argued that behavior change programs involving the manipulation of consequences should be replaced with more "intrinsically motivating" systems in all applied settings, but particularly in schools, businesses, and clinics (Condry, 1977;  Deci, 1975a; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Kohn, 1988;  Levine & Fasnacht, 1974) .
The criticism that contingent consequences may decrease intrinsic motivation is based on the belief that a sharp distinction can be made between behavior maintained by obvious environmenPortions of this paper were presented at the annual meetings ofthe Association for Behavior Analysis, May 1986, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and the Northern California Association for Behavior Analysis, March 1987, San Mateo, California. I would like to express my appreciation to Wayne Fuqua, Jack Michael, and William Redmon for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
tal consequences-extrinsically motivated behavior-and behavior that occurs in the seeming absence of consequencesintrinsically motivated behavior. According to this position, the impetus for action is primarily internal or intrinsic or primarily external or extrinsic (Pittman & Heller, 1987) . Because intrinsically motivated behavior is believed to be more creative, spontaneous, and flexible than extrinsically motivated behavior, it is feared that by damaging intrinsic motivation, the use of extrinsic consequences will result in a decrease in highly valued human behavior (Amabile, 1982 (Amabile, , 1985  Deci & Ryan, 1985, p. 35; McGraw & McCullers, 1979; Shapira, 1976) .
INTRINSICALLY VERSUS EXTRINSICALLY CONTROLLED BEHAVIOR Intrinsic motivation was originally proposed to account for exploratory and manipulative behavior in nonhuman animals (Harlow, 1950; Harlow, Harlow, & Meyer, 1950) and was later used to explain human behavior believed to be caused by such motives as a need for achievement (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953) , a need to be effective when dealing with the environment (White, 1959) , a need to be selfdetermining (Deci, 1 975a) , and a need to be a causal agent when dealing with the environment (deCharms, 1968) . In all cases, behavior that could not be attributed to external controls was attributed to intrinsic motivation. "'Intrinsic motivation' was thus defined by default: performance in the absence of extrinsic rewards" (Zimmerman, 1985, p. 118) . As illustrated in Franken's recent text on motivation (1988) , behavior is still operationally classified as extrinsically or intrinsically motivated depending upon whether or not external controlling variables can be readily identified:
When the activity itselfprovides the reward, we say that the activity is intrinsically rewarding; when an activity is done in order to obtain a reward that is unrelated to it, then we say that the activity is extrinsically rewarding. A child who does well in school simply to gain approval from his parents or to acquire a skill that he can then use to earn money or acquire fame is engaging in the activity for extrinsic reasons (rewards). If, however, he finds the activity motivating [italics added] even in the absence of approval or some other form of gain, then we say that he is engaging in the activity for intrinsic rea- 
sons (rewards). (p. 31)
The teleological "in order to," the pejorative "simply," and the equation of "rewards" with "reasons" are all typical of the traditional approach to this distinction. Horcones (1987) has formalized a similar, but not identical, distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic consequences from a more behavioral perspective:
Intrinsic consequences are the natural and automatic results of responding (see Horcones, 1983; Vaughan and Michael, 1982) . They are more or less inevitably produced by the structural characteristics of the physical environment and the biological organism; they are not programmed by others to occur. In contrast, extrinsic consequences occur in addition to any intrinsic consequences. They may be programmed by our social environments, by applied behavior analysts, by researchers, and by teachers and others, but they do not occur solely as a natural consequence ofresponding. (pp. [291] [292] One kind of generalized reinforcer is created because many primary reinforcers are received only after the physical environment has been efficiently manipulated. One form ofprecurrent behavior may precede different kinds ofreinforcers upon different occasions. The immediate stimulation from such behavior will thus become a generalized reinforcer. We are automatically reinforced, apart from any particular deprivation, when we successfully control the physical world. This may explain our tendency to engage in skilled crafts, in artistic creation, and in such sports as bowling, billiards, and tennis.
It is possible, however, that some of the reinforcing effect of "sensory feed-back" is unconditioned. A baby appears to be reinforced by stimulation from the environment which has not been followed by primary reinforcement. The baby's rattle is an example. The capacity to be reinforced in this way could have arisen in the evolutionary process, and it may have a parallel in the reinforcement we receive from simply "making the world behave." Any organism which is reinforced by its success in manipulating nature, regardless of the momentary consequences, will be in a favored position when important consequences follow. (pp. 77-78) Intrinsic reinforcers may also represent a simple form of conditioned reinforcement, in which the stimuli associated with the task have been correlated with approval, praise, or some other form of reinforcement.
In Lepper and his colleagues (Deci, 1971 (Deci, , 1972a (Deci, , 1972b Greene & Lepper, 1974; Lepper & Greene, 1975; Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973) , and subsequently by many others (e.g., Anderson, Manoogian, & Reznick, 1976; Calder & Staw, 1975; Harackiewicz, 1979; Kamiol & Ross, 1977; Loveland & Olley, 1979; Pinder, 1976; Pritchard, Campbell, & Campbell, 1977; Ross, 1975; Weiner, 1980) . In the traditional research paradigm, activities assumed to be intrinsically motivatingassembling puzzles, solving anagrams, drawing with magic markers-are provided to subjects. Experimental subjects are promised a reward for performing the activity and the reward is provided at the end of a single 30-or 60-min session. Control subjects perform the activity without being promised or ultimately receiving any reward. Both groups are then observed during a nonreward period that occurs immediately following the experimental session or several weeks later. If experimental subjects perform the task less than control subjects, the extrinsic rewards are said to have decreased intrinsic motivation.
Behavioral researchers, using a multiple-trial within-subject research paradigm, began investigating the detrimental effects ofextrinsic rewards in response to the research cited above. Their results appeared to conflict with those reported by cognitively oriented researchers (Davidson & Bucher, 1978; Feingold & Mahoney, 1975; Mawhinney, Dickinson, & Taylor, in press; Vasta, Andrews, McLaughlin, Stirpe, & Comfort, 1978; Vasta & Stirpe, 1979 (Lepper, 1981; Mawhinney, 1979; Scott, 1975 Scott, , 1980 , some of the differences in results can be attributed to different research strategies. However, careful examination ofthe research leads to the conclusion that under some conditions extrinsic rewards do decrease subsequent performance when the rewards are no longer available, although those conditions remain to be fully specified.
There are now well over 100 studies that have examined the detrimental effects of extrinsic rewards. Most of the studies, as with much of the traditional research in personality and social psychology, are theory-driven and as a result tend to be highly contrived. Experimental conditions are designed to test a specific hypothesis or combination of hypotheses, and conclusions are based on complex statistical comparisons between subtly different conditions. Further, arguments in support of favored hypotheses are often based on small but statistically significant differences (Mawhinney, 1979) . Due to the large number of studies, their diversity, and their complexity, this research will not be systematically reviewed. Rather, nonbehavioral and behavioral explanations of post-reward decrements will be presented and, following those, a number of general points about the research findings will be made. These points identify some characteristic patterns in the research that will help readers respond to claims that extrinsic rewards have harmful effects and better enable the critical review of relevant experimental studies. Readers who are interested in detailed reviews of the literature are referred to Deci and Ryan (1985) , Lepper and Greene (1978) , Morgan (1984) , and Zimmerman (1985) . COGNITIVE EXPLANATIONS OF DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS Claims that extrinsic rewards may weaken intrinsic motivation were originally derived from self-perception and attribution theories. According to these theories a person's perceptions about the causes of ongoing behavior strongly influence future motivation and performance. In the absence of obvious external controls, a person will attribute his or her behavior to intrinsic interest or motivation and will, therefore, continue to engage in the behavior when extrinsic controls are not present. But if salient extrinsic controls are present, behavior will be attributed to those controls and, as a result, will not readily occur in their absence in the future. Based on these tenets, Lepper et al. (1973) proposed the following:
Self-perception theory has a number of heuristic implications, one of the most intriguing of which could be termed the "overjustification" hypothesis-the proposition that a person's intrinsic interest in an activity may be undermined by inducing him to engage in that activity as an explicit means to some extrinsic goal. If the external justification provided to induce a person to engage in an activity is unnecessarily high and psychologically "oversufficient," the person might come to infer that his actions were basically motivated by the external contingencies of the situation, rather than by any intrinsic interest in the activity itself. In short, a person induced to undertake an inherently desirable activity as a means to some ulterior end should cease to see the activity as an end in itself. (p. 130) Stated more behaviorally (without, for the moment, considering the validity of the assertion), when behavior that was previously controlled by intrinsic rewards comes to be controlled by extrinsic rewards and the behaver reacts to the controlling relation itself as a stimulus (perceives it), the reinforcing value ofthe intrinsic consequences is weakened. Therefore, in the future when extrinsic consequences are no longer available, the behavior occurs at a lower frequency. Lepper (1981) has explained that extrinsic rewards and controls will decrease intrinsic motivation only when the aforementioned perceptual shifts occur and has criticized extreme advocates for extrapolating "far beyond the available evidence to argue, in general, against the use of systematic reward programs to modify behavior" (p. 170). According to Lepper, perceptual shifts are likely when there is sufficient initial interest in the activity to allow perceptual shifts ofcausality, when the relationship between performance and the extrinsic rewards is salient, and when rewards do not increase perceived competence.
Deci (1975a) also originally maintained that perceptions of external control decreased intrinsic motivation. However, he subsequently revised his theory, believing that this strictly cognitive explanation did not adequately address the underlying motivational processes (Deci & Ryan, 1985 Deci and Ryan (1985) have claimed that post-reward performance changes challenge "several important foundations of operant psychology" (p. 182). However, there are a number of possible behavioral reasons why behavior maintained by intrinsic reinforcers might deviate from baseline levels following the termination of extrinsic rewards.
First, decrements in task performance may result from a reduction in the reinforcing effectiveness of the intrinsic consequences due to simple repetition. Extrinsic reinforcement of behavior maintained by sensory reinforcers increases the frequency ofbehavior and thus also increases exposure to the sensory reinforcers. Repeated exposure to sensory reinforcers has long been known to momentarily weaken their reinforcing effectiveness, although the physiological mechanisms responsible for this process are unknown (Antonitis & Barnes, 1961; Berlyne, 1955;  Kish, 1966; Kish & Baron, 1962; Montgomery, 1952; Welker, 1956) . Performance controlled by intrinsic sensory reinforcers would, thus, be expected to temporarily drop below baseline levels when extrinsic reinforcement was discontinued.
Second, the performance of an activity may be subsequently affected if the control procedures are aversive. Although rewards are generally positive events, there are at least three reward situations that might involve aversive stimulation. Performance standards are-often introduced during reward, and rewards are made contingent upon meeting those standards. Ifindividuals fail to meet those standards, such failure could, as conditioned punishment, exert relatively more control than the intrinsic consequences, temporarily decreasing the subsequent frequency ofthe behavior, and could also weaken the reinforcing value of the intrinsic consequences with which it was paired. This analysis is supported by the results of studies that have examined the effects of failure on subsequent performance (Karniol & Ross, 1977; Rosen- field, Folger, & Adelman, 1980; Salancik, 1975; Zimmerman, 1985) .
Another way that rewards could be related to a form ofaversiveness is through coercion. In our society, rewards are often used to induce people (especially children) to engage in nonpreferred activities and, in addition, are sometimes combined with threats of punishment for noncompliance. Skinner (1953) (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Lepper, 1981; Williams, 1980) . Performance may also decrease following coercive control procedures because of what is commonly referred to as deliberate noncompliance, refusing to engage in the task "in order to get even" with the coercer. If the coerced individual is angry, signs of discomfort on the part ofthe coercer will be reinforcing and any behavior that has in the past produced such discomfort will be strong. During reward administration, the rewards may maintain behavior; however, when they are no longer available behavior that has irritated or inconvenienced coercers may be momentarily strong.
A third possible reason for performance decrements is based on subtle cultural reinforcing practices. In our society, people are often admired and praised when they engage in intrinsically controlled behavior, especially ifit is viewed as artistic, original, creative, or intellectual. The very fact that the behavior is unrelated to any obvious extrinsic consequence is, in part, the basis for the approval. Explicit promises of reward and payment, on the other hand, are typically provided for behaviors that are not considered to be interesting or valuable in and of themselves. Promises of reward and payment may, therefore, become differentially correlated with the absence of praise for creativity, originality, and so on, and, for those who are strongly reinforced by such praise, counteract some of the reinforcing effectiveness of the intrinsic consequences.
Finally, Mawhinney (1979) has suggested that post-extrinsic-reward performance decrements may be explained in terms of optimal duration theory (Dunham, 1977 ). This theory is too complex to be adequately explained in the.present paper but, roughly speaking, proposes that various behaviors, when not artificially constrained, have an optimal duration of occurrence. Reinforcement may increase the duration above that optimal value and thus the decline following reinforcement may represent a momentary adjustment for the excessive time spent on the activity.
The effects described previously need not be strong in order to produce the postreward changes reported in the literature. Experimental studies have been designed in a way that enables the detection of small changes. During post-reinforcement phases, subjects have typically been provided with several alternative tasks, including the previously reinforced task. Because it is unlikely that subjects will refuse to perform any of the tasks, the previously rewarded task need only exert relatively less control over behavior than the others.
Not all of the post-reward decrements reported in the literature can be explained by one ofthe preceding analyses. However, they illustrate that post-reward decrements can be explained behavior-ally, and, in addition, suggest that some situations might well result in such decrements.
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESEARCH ON DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS Five aspects of the research findings will be discussed in the following section. They do not represent an exhaustive list of the issues and controversies generated by this body of research, but they are issues that should be considered when evaluating the generality and significance of post-reward decrements. Transience
The main concern of cognitive psychologists and practitioners is that extrinsic rewards may permanently destroy intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1978; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Lepper & Greene, 1978) . It is feared that a child, having lost intrinsic motivation for math or art, for example, may never regain it. But if post-reward decrements were transient, they would lose much of their theoretical and practical significance.
Cognitive researchers have consistently reported that performance decrements persist as long as two to four weeks after rewards have been terminated (Greene & Lepper, 1974; Harackiewicz, 1979; Lepper & Greene, 1975; Lepper et al., 1973; Morgan, 1983; Ross, 1975) , while behavioral researchers have reported that when decrements occur, which is rare, they are transient and disappear within one to two sessions (Davidson & Bucher, 1978; Deal & Madsen, 1980; Dickinson, 1985; Feingold & Mahoney, 1975; Hom & Maxwell, 1980; Vasta & Stirpe, 1979 ).
The differences in these results are due, at least in part, to the ways in which "persistence" has been experimentally investigated and thus defined by these two groups of researchers.
In the between-group research paradigm adopted by cognitive researchers, subjects perform a task during a single 30-or 60-min session and are promised and given a reward for doing so. First, extrinsic rewards are most likely to decrease post-reward performance when they are provided for engaging in the activity; that is, when subjects are promised and given rewards for performing the activity irrespective of quality or quantity. This type of reward contingency is referred to as a task-contingent procedure in contrast to participation-contingent procedures in which subjects receive rewards for attendance and participation, performance-contingent procedures in which rewards are based on performance standards, and success-contingent procedures in which subjects are told they have received the rewards because of good performance. Post-reward decrements have been reported in the majority of studies that have examined task-contingent rewards (e.g., Anderson et al., 1976; Calder & Staw, 1975; Danner & Lonky, 1981; Greene& Lepper, 1974; Lepper & Greene, 1975; Lepper et al., 1973; McGraw&Fiala, 1982; Ross, 1975; Ross, Karniol, & Rothstein, 1976) . In contrast, decrements have not been reported in the majority ofstudies that have examined participation-contingent rewards (e.g., Deci, 1972a; Pinder, 1976; Swann & Pittman, 1977) or performance-contingent rewards (e.g., Farr, 1976; Farr, Vance, & McIntyre, 1977; Feingold & Mahoney, 1975; Reiss & Sushinsky, 1975; Vasta & Stirpe, 1979) . Further, when compared within the same experiment, task-contingent rewards have significantly decreased post-reward performance relative to performance-contingent rewards (Boggiano & Ruble, 1979; Enzle & Ross, 1978; Luyten & Lens, 1981) and relative to success-contingent rewards (Boggiano & Ruble, 1979; Karniol & Ross, 1977; Rosenfield et al., 1980; Zimmerman, 1985) . An exception is the study by Ryan, Mims, and Koestner (1983) in which post-reward responding was not differentially affected by task-and performance-contingent rewards. In spite of the fact that the detrimental effects of task-contingent rewards appear welldocumented, Bandura (1987) has argued that they are "of no great social import because rewards are rarely showered on people regardless of how they behave" (p. 246). Of greater social significance would be post-reward decrements due to rewards based on standards of performance, the type of rewards considered next.
When consequences depend upon meeting performance standards, a complication arises from the fact that some subjects may not meet the standards and thus may not receive the rewards. The proper analysis of their data is problematic. In many studies, this problem is ignored and the data for subjects exposed to performance standards is combined, irrespective of performance, and compared with the performance of subjects who were not provided with performance standards. This procedure may account for the conflicting results of studies that have examined performance-contingent rewards (Deci, 1971 (Deci, , 1972a (Deci, , 1972b Enzle & Ross, 1978; Farr, 1976; Farr et al., 1977; Harackiewicz, 1979; Pinder, 1976; Porac & Meindl, 1982; Weiner, 1980) . The problem has been avoided in some studies by informing subjects ofthe standards and then manipulating their performance so that it met or exceeded the standards, or by informing subjects at the time of reward, but following their performance, that they had performed above the norm. When these types ofbo-gus performance standards are studied, the reward procedure is referred to as success-contingent.
Success-contingent rewards have sustained or increased post-reward performance (Anderson et al., 1976;  Arkes, 1979; Boggiano & Ruble, 1979; Kamiol & Ross, 1977; Martin, 1977; Rosenfield et al., 1980; Weiner & Mander, 1978; Zimmerman, 1985) . This effect is robust and consistent, although often ignored in diatribes against the use of performancecontingent rewards. Results of three studies, further, suggest that successbased rewards are preferable to task-based rewards for high performers, results that should be of considerable interest to business executives and educators. In these studies, the post-reward performance of high success subjects increased following success-contingent rewards but decreased following task-contingent rewards (Karniol & Ross, 1977; Rosenfield et al., 1980; Zimmerman, 1985) .
Even strong opponents of contingent rewards recognize that success-based rewards do not have harmful effects. For example, when arguing against performance-contingent rewards in work settings, Deci and Ryan (1985) repeatedly refer to the beneficial effects of successbased or, in their terminology, "informational" rewards:
The important point is that rewards, like feedback, when used to convey to people a sense of appreciation for work well done, will tend to be experienced informationally and will maintain or enhance intrinsic motivation, but when they are used to motivate people, they will surely be experienced controllingly and will undermine intrinsic motivation. (p. 300) Whenever rewards are used to motivate peoplein other words, to control them-it is probable that they will have a negative effect on the people's intrinsic motivation.... However, rewards that are appropriately linked to performance, representing positive feedback in an informational context, ought not to be detrimental. The cost to the system, however, in signifying good performance through the use of performance-contingent rewards is that many people end up receiving the message that they are not doing very well and this is likely to be amotivating. (p. 310) As suggested by Deci and Ryan (1985) , the effects of performance-contingent rewards certainly depend upon how well people perform in relation to specified performance standards, that is, whether rewards provide positive or negative feedback. Studies have documented that rewards provided for success and success irrespective of reward increase post-reward performance, but failure to perform well enough to receive rewards and task failure in general decrease post-reward performance (Kamiol & Ross, 1977; Rosenfield et al., 1980; Salancik, 1975; Zimmerman, 1985) . If, under performance-contingent reward systems, "many people end up receiving the message that they are not doing very well" and, as a result, lose interest in the task, the fault lies not with the contingent rewards, but with the performance standards upon which the rewards are based. Considering the detrimental effects of task-based rewards and the enhancing effects of success-based rewards, the use of performance-contingent rewards should not be discouraged, but rather the development of objective, attainable performance standards upon which rewards are based should be encouraged. Applied behavior analysts have, of course, traditionally advocated the development of such peerformance standards.
Rewards Versus Reward Procedures
In some studies decrements attributed to rewards, whether task-contingent or performance-contingent, may have been due to other features of the reward procedures. A number of factors have been shown to decrease the subsequent performance of intrinsically rewarding activities irrespective of reward: failure to meet specified performance standards (Boggiano & Ruble, 1979; Karniol & Ross, 1977; Salancik, 1975) ; instructing subjects that they "should" perform the task (Ryan, 1982; Ryan et al., 1983; Williams, 1980) ; close monitoring of performance (Lepper & Greene, 1975; Pittman, Davey, Alafat, Wetherill, & Kramer, 1980) ; the experimenter's ignoring performance (Anderson et al., 1976) ; evaluation of performance (Amabile, 1979; Smith, 1975) ; temporal deadlines (Amabile, DeJong, ; and competition (Deci, Betley, Kahle, Abrams, & Porac, 1981) . Reward procedures used in this type ofresearch have often contained one or more ofthese features, which could have been responsible for or at least contributed to reported post-reward decrements. For example, in one frequently cited study competition and failure to receive the reward were confounded with financial rewards, yet subsequent performance decreases were attributed to the rewards (Pritchard et al., 1977) . Seventeen subjects in the monetary reward condition were divided into three groups and informed that the top performer of each group would receive $5.00. Thus, in this competitive situation only three subjects actually received a reward. In spite of that, the performances ofall 17 subjects were combined and designated as the financial incentive group data. When the performance of these subjects was compared with the performance of nonrewarded control subjects, decrements were found. It is entirely possible that the decrements were not due to the "financial incentives" per se, which most subjects did not receive, but to competition and/or failing to perform well enough to receive the incentives.
As The manipulation ofindependent variables appears to be circumvented when, instead of exposing an organism to a set ofcontingencies, the contingencies are simply described in "instructions." Instead of shaping a response, the subject is told to respond in a given way. A history of reinforcement or punishment is replaced by a promise or threat....
Descriptions ofcontingencies are, ofcourse, often effective.... Verbal communication is not, however, a substitute for the arrangement and manipulation of variables.
There is no reason why a description of contingencies of reinforcement should have the same effect as exposure to the contingencies. A subject can seldom accurately describe the way in which he has actually been reinforced. Even when he has been trained to identify a few simple contingencies, he cannot then describe a new contingency, particularly when it is complex. We can scarcely expect him, therefore, to react appropriately to descriptions by the experimenter. Moreover, the verbal contingencies between subject and experimenter must be taken into account. Instructions must in some way promise or threaten consequences not germane to the experiment ifthe subject is to follow them. (p. 114-115) Task performance evoked by instructions and promises of reward can be influenced by a number of factors, includ-ing the sophistication of the subject's verbal repertoire, the subject's history with respect to whether promised rewards were actually received, the nature of the subject's prior exposure to the object being offered as the reward, whether the particular wording of the request to perform the task has been correlated with punishment for noncompliance, and events that occur during the delay between the promise and reward delivery, such as the way the experimenter interacts with the subject. As mentioned earlier, some of these factors have been demonstrated experimentally to produce post-intervention decrements irrespective of reward, which makes the attribution ofperformance decrements to extrinsic reinforcement quite controvertible.
Most behavioral researchers have implemented procedures that conform to conventional reinforcement practices, and thus some ofthe differences observed between behavioral and nonbehavioral research may be due to the differences between reward and reinforcement procedures. A few behavioral researchers, however, have also used instructions and promised-reward procedures rather than actual reinforcement but, unlike nonbehavioral researchers, they have conducted multiple reward sessions (Deal & Madsen, 1980; Feingold & Mahoney, 1975) . This difference is important for two reasons. First, during initial reward sessions subjects come into contact with the reward contingencies, so performance may come under their control and be less influenced by factors related to instructions and promises. Second, subjects who receive delayed rewards have a favorable history at least within the context of the experiment in which promised rewards were actually delivered, eliminating one possible confound due to differences in subject reinforcement histories.
Nonreinforcing versus reinforcing rewards. Lepper (1981) (Calder & Staw, 1975; Deci, 1975b; Greene, Sternberg, & Lepper, 1976; Kruglanski, Alan, & Lewis, 1972; Kruglanski, Riter, Amitai, Margolin, Shabtai, & Zaksh, 1975; Ross; Ross et al., 1976) . When rewards do not affect task performance, it is completely inappropriate to attribute post-reward decrements to reinforcement: rather, they should be attributed to nonreinforcing rewards.
Results from a study by Williams (1980) suggest that nonreinforcing rewards may be more likely to result in post-reward decrements than reinforcing rewards, emphasizing the importance of the distinction. The study consisted of three one-session phases: baseline, reward, and post-reward. The relative "attractiveness" of several rewards was assessed in a pre-baseline session. During the reward phase, subjects in one group were promised attractive rewards for performing a task while subjects in another group were promised unattractive rewards. Because rewards were promised, and delivered only once at the end of the session rather than repeatedly, the interpretation ofthe results is problematic, as discussed previously. However, the promise of the attractive rewards did increase performance relative to the subjects' own baseline performance and relative to the performance of subjects who were promised unattractive rewards, suggesting that the attractive rewards would probably have functioned as reinforcers under a repetitive-delivery procedure.
Results indicated that the post-reward performance of subjects who were promised unattractive rewards decreased relative to their baseline performance and relative to the performance of subjects who were promised attractive rewards. The post-reward performance ofsubjects who were promised attractive rewards, however, did not decrease relative to baseline performance. In a post-hoc analysis, Williams examined the relationship between the degree of reward attractive-ness and post-reward responding. Subjects were divided into four categories depending upon the extent to which their performance increased during the reward phase. Post-reward increases were observed for subjects whose performance increased the most during the reward phase while post-reward decreases were observed for the other subjects. For the subjects who displayed post-reward decrements, the size of the decrement was inversely related to the size of the increase during reward: the greater the post-reward decrement, the smaller the increase during reward. These data suggest that highly reinforcing rewards may result in post-reward performance increases, while less reinforcing or nonreinforcing rewards may result in postreward decreases.
Additional 
